Mariam Safi  
October, 2010

Western countries are ostensibly eager to keep Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful) of the Taliban movement out of peace talks with the Afghan government. But is this a realistic approach, or at the very least, a viable strategy? Looking at the structure of the insurgency it seems highly ambitious to assume that elements within the insurgency will circumvent its Amir and join the negotiation table to end the long and tragic violence that paralyzed the socio-economic and political development of Afghanistan for three decades.  The Strengthening Peace Commission (PTS) established in 2003 and led by Hazrat Sebghatullah Mojaddedi claims to have disarmed 9,000 insurgents since its creation but in reality these numbers are questionable. The failures of PTS were largely a result of an incoherent reintegration strategy, lack of mechanisms for oversight and implementation and insufficient resources. This article will evaluate the insurgency’s position on reconciliation and reintegration and identify possible hindrances and solutions to overt barriers to the peace process as outlined by former and current Taliban members. This analysis has drawn exclusively on interviews with the Former Foreign Affairs Minister of the Taliban regime, Mullah Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil and prominent Afghan journalist, Mujahid Kakar. In addition to citing scripts and interviews conducted with various influential members of the Quetta Shura. (Full Artical,file type (Pdf) 120 KB )